Study Guide Instructor view

Non-Repudiation

Teaching notes for Lesson 1.7, with controls for presenting it.

Keep this page on your own screen. Share only the lesson window. The lesson window holds no teaching notes, so sharing it cannot show them.

Presenting

  1. Open the lesson in its own window and share that window, not this one.
  2. Use Next and Previous here, or the lesson’s own, to move through the lesson. Next reveals one thing at a time: the next idea, or the answer to the question on screen, then the next step. Previous takes the last reveal back. The line below says what is on screen and what Next will show.
  3. Reveal hints and answers when the class is ready, and reset a demonstration before using it again.

The controls need JavaScript and a browser that supports BroadcastChannel. Without them, open the lesson in presentation mode and use its own controls.

The two windows talk to each other only inside this browser, on this device. Nothing is sent to a server, and no account is needed. A second device (a phone or another tablet) cannot follow the lesson window yet.

Lesson plan

Level
Beginner
Time
About 60 minutes; the steps below add up to 62

Learners start from a disputed parcel delivery: what evidence would make a denial hard to believe, and what a delivery signature does not show. That gives them the idea of non-repudiation, and its limit, before the term arrives. Predictions then precede each point beginners confuse: a payments system where all three CIA objectives hold yet a key question is open (why a fourth property is needed), a shared login (why identities must be individual), a signed form whose content is intact (integrity against non-repudiation) and a stolen password (what weakens the evidence). The habit to build: ask whether a question is about the state of the data or about who acted.

Objectives

  • Explain non-repudiation as evidence of who did what, strong enough that a denial is not credible
  • Explain why non-repudiation is not part of the CIA triad
  • Name the mechanisms that provide it, and why each depends on individual identities
  • Tell an integrity question from a non-repudiation question
  • Say what weakens the evidence

Before the lesson

  • Open this page on your own screen and use “Open the lesson window” to open the lesson in a second window. Share only that second window.
  • Learners need the CIA Triad lesson first.
  • Draw two columns on the board, “Has it changed?” and “Who did it?”, to sort questions into during the integrity step.
  • The lesson takes about 62 minutes. To teach it in two parts, stop after “Integrity and non-repudiation”; the second part opens with “Four properties at a water-treatment plant”.
  • In presentation mode every step is shown in turns: Next reveals one moment, part or answer at a time, and the instructor view names what is on screen and what comes next.

Steps

  1. Introduction Opening

    On screen: the lesson’s title, module and number; Next adds its objectives and key terms, as the lesson page lists them; Next again begins the first step.

    Objectives on screen

    • Explain non-repudiation as evidence of who did what, strong enough that a denial is not credible
    • Explain why non-repudiation is not part of the CIA triad
    • Name the mechanisms that provide it, and why each depends on individual identities
    • Tell an integrity question from a non-repudiation question
    • Say what weakens the evidence

    Purpose: Learners start from a disputed parcel delivery: what evidence would make a denial hard to believe, and what a delivery signature does not show. That gives them the idea of non-repudiation, and its limit, before the term arrives. Predictions then precede each point beginners confuse: a payments system where all three CIA objectives hold yet a key question is open (why a fourth property is needed), a shared login (why identities must be individual), a signed form whose content is intact (integrity against non-repudiation) and a stolen password (what weakens the evidence). The habit to build: ask whether a question is about the state of the data or about who acted.

  2. 1. “It was not me” Think 6 min

    Purpose: Find the idea of hard-to-deny evidence from a familiar dispute, and its limit: it says who acted, not what state things were in.

    Ask

    • What could the shop show you that would make your denial hard to believe?
    • Does the signature show the laptop was undamaged?

    Responses to expect

    • Signature, time, photograph, tracking. Ask which would be hardest to fake.
    • Some say yes; ask whether anyone looked inside the box.
    • On screen in turns: the opening question, its answer; then the question on what the signature shows, and its answer.

    Discussion pause: Collect the kinds of evidence before revealing the explanation.

    To go further

    • Which of the courier's records would be easiest to fake, and why?

    In the lesson window

    • Think it through: What could the shop show you that would make it hard for you to keep saying the parcel never arrived?
    • Think it through: The courier’s record shows your signature at 10:14 on Tuesday. Does that show the laptop was not opened or damaged on the way?
  3. 2. The idea Explain 6 min

    Purpose: Name repudiation and non-repudiation, and fix three points: evidence not prevention, both directions, credible not certain.

    Ask

    • How can the same records protect the engineer who was wrongly blamed?

    Responses to expect

    • Most see it once asked who the records show did make the change.
    • On screen in turns: the opening; then the definition of non-repudiation; the signed-for delivery as the everyday version; three points to fix early, starting with evidence and accountability; that it works in both directions; why the word credibly matters; the check question on the wrongly blamed engineer, and its answer.

    Misconceptions to challenge

    • A learner may believe: “Non-repudiation is about keeping things secret.” Respond: It is about evidence of actions; secrecy is confidentiality.

    If the explanation does not land: Think of a referee’s video replay: it does not stop a foul, but it settles afterwards who committed it, and clears a player who did not.

    In the lesson window

    • Check your understanding: An engineer is told she changed a pump setting overnight. She did not. How can non-repudiation help her?
  4. 3. A fourth property outside the triad Predict 6 min

    Purpose: Show why a fourth question is needed, and that non-repudiation sits outside the triad.

    Ask

    • Private, accurate, available, and a wrong payment approved. What is still unknown?

    Responses to expect

    • Some answer with integrity. Remind them the record is accurate by assumption.
    • On screen in turns: the opening question, its answer; then why non-repudiation is not part of the triad; the triad’s three questions; the fourth property, outside the triad; why a fourth question is needed.

    Misconceptions to challenge

    • A learner may believe: “Non-repudiation is the fourth part of the CIA triad.” Respond: A triad has three parts; this is an additional property discussed alongside it.

    Discussion pause: Before the fourth row appears, ask what question the three CIA rows still leave unanswered about the payment.

    In the lesson window

    • Think it through: In a payments system every record is private, accurate and available. Yet a payment has been approved that should not have been. What does the organisation still need to find out?
  5. 4. How non-repudiation is provided Predict 8 min

    Purpose: Introduce the four mechanisms, then discover from a shared login that all of them depend on individual identities.

    Ask

    • The shared cabinet login opened it at 03:10. Who did it?

    Responses to expect

    • “The nurse in charge” comes up; ask what the log actually records.
    • On screen in turns: the opening; then the mechanisms, starting with digital signatures; certificates; timestamps; audit records; the question on the shared medicines-cabinet login, and its answer; why each person must act as themselves; what makes evidence hard to deny.

    If the explanation does not land: Return to the parcel: if three people in a house share one name on the delivery record, who signed?

    To go further

    • Why must the log be protected from the person it records, and how might that be done?

    In the lesson window

    • Think it through: Three night-shift nurses share one login to a hospital’s medicines cabinet. The log shows that login opened the cabinet at 03:10. Who opened it?
  6. 5. Integrity and non-repudiation Predict 9 min

    Purpose: Separate the two questions, using the consent form and the signed contract.

    Ask

    • Unchanged form, disputed signature: integrity problem or not?
    • Sort these into the two columns: was the price altered; who approved the order; did the file arrive intact; can the sender deny sending it.

    Responses to expect

    • Many call any signature dispute an integrity issue. Ask whether anything in the form changed.
    • The signed-contract example reveals one case at a time: ask the class, before each, which property the case is about.
    • On screen in turns: the opening question, its answer; then the question each property asks; integrity and non-repudiation compared; the signed contract, with its valid signature only; a figure changed on the way; nothing changed, but the supplier denies it; how the two can fail separately; why non-repudiation does not prevent modification.

    Misconceptions to challenge

    • A learner may believe: “Integrity and non-repudiation are the same thing because one signature gives both.” Respond: One mechanism, two questions; either can fail while the other holds.
    • A learner may believe: “Non-repudiation stops data being changed.” Respond: It attributes actions. Detection is integrity; prevention needs other controls.

    In the lesson window

    • Think it through: A parent signs a school-trip consent form online with a digital signature. Later they say they never agreed. The form is exactly as it was signed. Is this an integrity problem?
  7. 6. Four properties at a water-treatment plant Experiment 8 min

    Purpose: Apply all four properties to one physical system, before and then with the diagram.

    Ask

    • Name one thing at the plant that each property protects.
    • Why might integrity and availability weigh more heavily here than in an office?

    Responses to expect

    • Confidentiality answers are often about customer data; steer to diagrams, credentials and settings.
    • Diagram: what each property protects is held back; let pairs name something for each property first, then reveal.
    • On screen in turns: the opening question, its answer; then the plant diagram, with what each property protects held back; what each property protects, and what failure looks like; reading the diagram one property at a time; why integrity and availability weigh heavily here.

    Discussion pause: Let pairs fill in all four before showing the diagram.

    In the lesson window

    • Think it through: Before you look at the diagram: for each of the four properties, name one thing at a water-treatment plant that it would protect.
  8. 7. Limits of the evidence Predict 6 min

    Purpose: Show what weakens the evidence: shared accounts, stolen credentials, editable or missing records, disagreeing clocks.

    Ask

    • Stolen password, approved payment: can the manager deny it?

    Responses to expect

    • Many say no because the log is clear. Ask whose hands were on the keyboard.
    • On screen in turns: the opening question, its answer; then four things that weaken the evidence; the familiar rules non-repudiation explains.

    Misconceptions to challenge

    • A learner may believe: “A log entry proves who did it.” Respond: Only with individual accounts, sound authentication and a protected log.

    If the explanation does not land: A signed visitors’ book proves little if everyone signs one shared name, if anyone can tear out a page, or if the clock on the wall is wrong.

    In the lesson window

    • Think it through: An attacker steals a manager’s password and approves a payment with it. The audit log shows the manager’s account approved it. Can the manager credibly deny it?
  9. 8. Apply it in a new situation Apply 4 min

    Purpose: Set up independent application, ideally on a later day.

    Ask

    • Who will try these now, and who later in the week?

    Responses to expect

    • The editable log tests the fourth evidence condition; the invoice claim tests detection against prevention.
    • On screen in turns: the opening question, its answer; then the question on signed invoices, and its answer.

    In the lesson window

    • Apply it: A company’s IT administrators can edit and delete the log that records their own actions. An administrator is accused of disabling a backup. How strong is the log as evidence?
    • Apply it: A manager says: “We digitally sign our invoices, so nobody can change them.” What is the best response?
  10. 9. Check your understanding Check 6 min

    Purpose: Check the lesson against the approved revision-bank questions.

    Ask

    • Answer individually, then compare before revealing.

    Responses to expect

    • The evidence-sources question is multiple-select.
    • On screen in turns: the opening; then the revision questions one at a time, each followed by its answer; where to practise next.
  11. 10. What to remember Consolidate 3 min

    Purpose: Summarise the five points, the key terms and the misunderstandings.

    Ask

    • Without looking: what question does non-repudiation ask, and what question does integrity ask?

    Responses to expect

    • Who did it and can they deny it; has the data changed.
    • On screen in turns: the opening; then the summary; the key terms; the common misunderstandings.
  12. Lesson recap Closing

    On screen: the lesson’s objectives again; Next adds the closing question, which asks the class to explain each one in their own words without looking back. It says nothing about what anyone has learnt: use the answers to decide what to revisit.

    Points to listen for

    • Hard-to-deny evidence of who did what, which also protects the wrongly accused.
    • Outside the triad: it concerns the trail of actions, not the state of the data.
    • Two questions, one signature: has it changed, and who acted.
    • One identity per person, or the evidence points at a group.
    • Detection and attribution, not prevention; weakened by shared or stolen credentials and editable logs.

Consolidation

  • Hard-to-deny evidence of who did what, which also protects the wrongly accused.
  • Outside the triad: it concerns the trail of actions, not the state of the data.
  • Two questions, one signature: has it changed, and who acted.
  • One identity per person, or the evidence points at a group.
  • Detection and attribution, not prevention; weakened by shared or stolen credentials and editable logs.